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PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICY ACT
OF 1978: ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE REFORM
PAUL L. JOSKOW*

The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978' (PURPA)
represents an effort by the federal government to affect the ways in
which state public utility commissions regulate the retail sales of
electric and gas utility companies. The act also amends portions of
the Federal Power Act 2 to expand the authority of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in certain areas of electricity
supply and reliability, such as interconnection, wheeling and cogeneration, and its regulatory authorities with respect to wholesale electricity rates. Finally, the act includes provisions for the establishment
of small hydroelectric projects, resolution of problems associated
with the expansion of crude oil transportation systems, grants for a
utility regulatory institute and coal research laboratories, and the
voluntary and emergency conversion of natural gas users to other
fuels.
This paper focuses on the economic foundations and implications
of the provisions of Title I of PURPA, which deals with retail sales
by electric utilities. Much of this discussion also has some relevance
to Title III of the act which deals (much less extensively) with retail
sales by natural gas utilities.
TITLE I: RETAIL REGULATORY POLICIES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES
Title I of PURPA3 establishes a variety of requirements and procedures for state public utility commissions to follow in establishing
retail electricity rates. Prior to the enactment of PURPA these activities had been entirely within the jurisdiction of state commissions. While PURPA does not change the primary jurisdiction of state
regulatory commissions or supersede state law with regard to the
determination of electricity rates, it does obligate state commissions
to consider a large number of specific rate-making standards. 4 The
act also gives consumer groups, electric utilities, and the Department
*Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1. 16 U.S.C.A. § § 2601-2645 (Supp. 1979).
2. 16 U.S.C. § § 791a-825r (1976).
3. 16 U.S.C.A. § §2611-2613 (Supp. 1979).
4. 16 U.S.C.A. § § 2621-2627 (Supp. 1979).
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of Energy (DOE) the right to intervene in state regulatory hearings
and certain appeals rights in the state and federal courts.'
The primary purpose of Title I is to encourage state commissions
to consider and implement new ratemaking methods and rate structures that will promote the objectives of the act. These objectives are
stated as (1) increased conservation of electric energy, (2) increased
efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electric utilities
and (3) equitable retail rates for electric consumers. 6 The act provides relatively detailed guidance concerning the kinds of rates that
should be considered. But by and large it obligates the state commissions only to "consider" and make "determinations," while leaving
ultimate implementation decisions up to the state commissions themselves.'
Section 1118 of the act requires state commissions to consider and
determine the applicability of six specific retail ratemaking standards. The process of consideration and determination must be conducted in public evidentiary hearings and while generic hearings are
permitted, considerations of the standards and determination of
applicability must be done separately for each utility. The following
six ratemaking standards are established by the act under Section
111.
(1) Cost of Service: Rates charged to each class of electric customers shall be designed to reflect the costs of providing electric
service to that class. Statutory guidance regarding the meaning of
"cost of service" is provided in Section 115(a) of the act, which I
discuss below.
(2) Declining Block Rates: The energy component of an electric
rate for any class of customers cannot decrease with aggregate electricity consumption unless the utility can demonstrate the costs of
providing the energy also decrease with aggregate consumption.
(3) Time-of-Day Rates: The rates charged for any class of customers shall vary on a time-of-day basis reflecting the variation in the
costs of providing the service on a time-of-day basis. Such time-ofday rates should not be applied if they are not deemed cost effective.
The meaning of "cost effective" is elaborated in Section 115(b),
which I discuss below.
(4) Seasonal Rates: The rates charged for each class of customers
shall be on a seasonal basis, and reflect the seasonal variation in the
5.
6.
7.
8.

16
16
16
16

U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.A.

§ §2631, 2633 (Supp. 1979).
§2611 (Supp. 1979).
§2627 (Supp. 1979).
§ 2621 (Supp. 1979).
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costs of providing electric service, to the extent that such cost variation exists for a particular utility.
(5) Interruptible Rates: Industrial and commercial consumers
shall be offered an interruptible rate which reflects the cost of providing interruptible service to the particular class of which the consumer is a member.
(6) Load Management Techniques: Each electric utility shall
offer to its customers such load management techniques as are
deemed (a) to be practicable and cost effective as determined under
Section 115(c); (b) to be reliable; and (c) to provide useful energy or
capacity management advantages to the electric utility.
The act gives each state two years to begin the consideration of
these standards or to set a hearing date, and three years to complete
the "consideration" and "determinations" regarding these federal
standards. 9 If the state commissions decide not to implement the
federal ratemaking standards, they are to specify clearly why they
have chosen not to do so. Apparently the act assumes states will
implement these ratemaking standards if they are consistent with the
purposes of PURPA and state law. However, it does not appear that
state commissions must implement the standards even if these two
criteria are met. Presumably, in this case state commissions would
have to specify good reasons for not implementing the standards or
face the possibility of successful appeals through the state courts by
the Department of Energy or intervenors, or further federal initiatives. However, the conference report implies that state commissions
have very broad authority regarding decisions to adopt the standards
or not.' 0
Section 113'' of PURPA specifies "certain standards" in addition
to the six ratemaking standards in Section 111 which state commissions are to consider and adopt within two years, if these standards
are consistent with the purposes of the act and state law. The state
commissions apparently have less discretion when deciding whether
to adopt these "certain standards" than the six ratemaking standards.
The five "certain standards" are:
(1) Master Metering: Master metering of electric service in new
buildings shall be prohibited or restricted to the extent necessary to
carry out the purposes of the act. Section 1 5(d) indicates this standard should be applied to multiunit buildings where the individual
units can control their individual consumption of electricity, and
9. 16 U.S.C.A. §2622 (Supp. 1979).
10. S. REP. NO. 1292, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 70-75 (1978).
11. 16 U.S.C.A. §2623 (Supp. 1979).
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where the long-run benefits to the consumer of replacing the master
meter with individual meters are greater than the additional costs of
the individual meters.
(2) Automatic Adjustment Clauses: No electric utility may increase any rate according to a fuel adjustment clause unless the following requirements specified in Section 115(e) are satisfied. Each
clause must be determined at least every four years, in an evidentiary
hearing by the state regulatory authority. The hearings are to determine if the clause provides incentives for efficient use of resources by
the electric utility. The clause must be reviewed at least every two
years, to insure the maximum economies in those operations and
purposes which affect the rates to which the adjustment clause applies.
(3) Information to Consumers: Each electric utility must provide
information on rate schedules that are available and applicable to
each consumer. Details about the information to be provided are
specified in Section 115(f).
(4) Procedures for Termination of Electric Service: Electric service may not be terminated unless the following conditions are met
as specified in Section 115(g). Reasonable prior notice must be given
before termination as well as a reasonable opportunity to dispute the
reasons for termination. If termination of service would be especially
dangerous to health, service may not be terminated if the customer is
unable to pay for the service or is able to pay for such service only in
installments. It appears that state commissions must implement this
provision if it is consistent with state law.
(5) Advertising: No electric utility may recover the cost of promotional and political advertising except from its shareholders. Section 115(h) exempts certain types of advertising that promotes the
purposes of the act, or that concerns employment opportunities,
service interruptions or emergencies.
Section 115 of the act elaborates on the rules to be used in considering the two different groups of standards. Those portions related
to the five "certain standards" already have been mentioned. The
remaining portions of Section 115 deal with the federal ratemaking
standards established under Section 111.
(a) Cost of Service: The cost of service methodology employed
under Section 111, to the maximum extent practicable, should (1)
permit identification of differences in cost for each class of customer
attributable to daily and seasonal time of use of service; (2) permit
identification of differences in cost attributable to differences in
customer demand and energy (fuel plus other variable costs). The
methodology should consider how total costs would vary with addi-
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tional power added to meet peak demand relative to base demand,
and with additional kilowatt-hours of electric energy delivered to
consumers.
(b) Time-of-Day Rates: A time-of-day rate should be considered
cost effective if the long-run benefits of such a rate to the utility and
customers in the class are likely to exceed the metering and other
costs associated with such rates.
(c) Load Management Techniques: Load management techniques
are cost effective if they are likely to reduce maximum kilowatt
demand on the utility, and the long-run cost savings to the utility are
likely to exceed the long-run costs of each technique.
Section 114' 2 of the act deals with "lifeline rates." These provide
special discount prices to consumers using small amounts of electricity. The presumption is that minimal levels of electricity consumption are required to meet "essential needs" and by providing
lower rates for small amounts of consumption, low-income people
can afford at least the "essential" amounts of power. Section 114
provides that no provision of the act should be interpreted as forbidding a regulatory commission from offering lifeline rates even if such
rates do not cover costs. In addition, this section provides that for
any utility which does not have a lower rate for "essential needs,"
the state commission must hold an evidentiary hearing within two
years to determine whether such a rate should be offered.
ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY ISSUES LEADING TO PURPA TITLE I
The passage of PURPA followed several years of increasing pressure to institute electric power rate reforms, especially the application of economic principles to the process of electricity ratemaking.
This increased interest in reform has been caused by a number of
factors which I have discussed in more detail elsewhere,' 3 and which
only are summarized here. First, beginning in the late 1960s, the
costs of electricity began to increase after several years of moderate
decline. This trend accelerated in the early 1970s, especially after the
rapid increases in oil prices beginning in late 1973. The increases in
the nominal costs of electric power production can be attributed to
several factors. First, the historical decrease in average boiler efficiencies leveled off as modern boiler technology replaced older, less
12. 16 U.S.C.A. §2624 (Supp. 1979).
13. See generally Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in
the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J. LAW AND ECON. 291 (1974); Joskow,
Electric Utility Rate Structures in the United States: Some Recent Developments in PUBLIC UTILITY RATE MAKING IN AN ENERGY CONSCIOUS ENVIRONMENT (W. Sichel
ed. 1978).
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efficient systems.' ' Second, as utility systems became larger and
interconnection and coordination spread, the advantages attributable
to economies of scale were gradually exhausted.' I Third, rising fuel
prices and interest rates, in the absence of countervailing increases in
production efficiency and scale economies, led to higher nominal
unit electricity costs. Finally, the marginal costs of new plant and
equipment rose at a rate significantly greater than the overall rate of
inflation. This increase was caused by the general increase in construction costs, environmental costs, and siting restrictions that
affect electric power generation and transmission facilities.
Increasing nominal production costs in the presence of fixed electricity prices established by state regulatory commissions inevitably
1
led to a decline in the profitability of electric power companies. 6
This in turn led these companies to make an unprecedented number
of requests before formal state regulatory bodies for higher prices
and rates of return in the face of increasing costs of capital. In 1965
there were only two formal reviews of rate increase requests by class
A and B electric utilities completed in the United States, but by
1974 this number had increased to 78.1 7

Increases in costs of electric power production and the rapid increase in formal regulatory activity were accompanied by an expanding and aggressive environmental movement, which had chosen the
electric power industry as one of its main targets. Environmentalists
were interested in reducing the rate of growth in electricity consumption since they anticipated this would reduce the need for more
generating facilities and cut the impact of electric power expansion
on the environment. Several environmental groups, particularly the
Environmental Defense Fund, saw rate reform and especially the use
of marginal cost pricing principles and peak-load pricing, as an important instrument for achieving these objectives. 1 And as prices began
to increase rapidly (especially after 1974), consumer groups started
advocating electric power rate reforms which would consider the
income distribution implications of rising electricity rates. While
14. See generally Joskow & Mishkin, Electric Utility Fuel Choice Behavior in the United
States, 18 INT'L ECON. REV. 719 (1977).
15. The production of some commodity by a firm is characterized by economies of scale
when the average cost of production declines as output increases. The definition takes all
input prices and the state of technology as fixed.
16. Supra note 13.
17. Supra note 13.
18. The Environmental Defense Fund was an active participant in the Madison Gas &
Electric case (WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY COMMISSION RE MADISON
GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, order dated August 8, 1978), participated in the generic
hearings held by the New York State Public Service Commission and has been active before
the California Public Utilities Commission. See ELECTRICAL WEEK, Nov. 29, 1976, at 3.
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environmental groups advocated the use of marginal cost pricing
principles to discourage the growth of peak electricity demand, consumer groups advocated "lifeline rates" which would reduce the
prices charged for retail customers consuming relatively small
amounts of electricity. These consumer groups assumed income and
electricity consumption were highly correlated and that overall increases in rates were especially hard on those with less money. 1 9
Increased funding for these environmental and consumer groups
combined with relaxed standing requirements of public utility commissions, to allow these groups to intervene in the increasing number
of formal state regulatory proceedings. The groups argued the state
commissions should pay more attention to issues of rate design and
not just focus on issues of average rate level and profitability.
In bolstering their case for rate reform, environmental groups
found the substantial body of economic literature on marginal cost
pricing of electric power led to rate reform conclusions consistent
with their objectives. Over the preceding two decades a substantial
economic literature on peak load pricing, based on marginal cost
pricing principles, had evolved in the United States, England and
France. Work by Turvey 2 0 and by economists at Electricitd de
France 2 1 developed and applied this theoretical work to the particular conceptual and empirical problems of determining marginal costs
and establishing associated rate structure for the electric power industry. This work became an integral part of the presentations of
those arguing for electricity rate reform.
While the theoretical and empirical details of peak load pricing
based on marginal cost pricing principles still are evolving, the basic
qualitative implications have remained pretty much the same. The
opportunity cost of electricity consumption tends to vary from hour
to hour during the year, depending on the relationship between
system demand and supply. Marginal costs are relatively high during
"peak" periods when capacity is close to full use and relatively low
during "off-peak" periods when demand is far below available capacity. Marginal opportunity costs are relatively high during the daytime hours in either the summer or the winter (depending on the mix
of heating and air-conditioning loads) and relatively low at night, on
weekends and in the spring and fall. Ignoring transactions costs (asso19. The objectives of those advocating rate reform for redistributive purposes and those
advocating rate reform on efficiency grounds are clearly different, although many commissions have tended to get them confused or to link them together so as to satisfy both sets of
interest groups.
20. See generally R. TURVEY, OPTIMAL PRICING AND INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (1968).
21. See generally J. NELSON, MARGINAL COST PRICING IN PRACTICE (1964).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

ciated primarily with the costs of metering), efficient pricing based
on marginal cost principles implies that prices should vary by time of
day and season of the year. However, in the United States, such
time-of-day rates had not been introduced except for scattered controlled water heating rates for residential customers. 2 2 Larger commercial and industrial customers often faced rate structures which
imposed a "demand charge" based on the customer's individual peak
demand, but these rates were not geared to the relevant system
demand and supply characteristics, and the charges did not vary by
time of day. As a result, in the early 1970s electric power rates in the
United States encouraged too much consumption during peak periods and not enough consumption during off-peak periods. Peak
demands were excessive, the system load factor of utilities was too
low, and the average cost of electricity was too high.
The proposals for peak load pricing systems based on marginal
cost principles were attractive to some public utility commissions for
other reasons. Faced with a growing number of requests for large rate
increases, the commissions found themselves the focus of considerable controversy. On the one hand utility companies argued the increases were required to finance increasingly expensive expansions in
production capacity. On the other hand, the commissions were faced
with angry consumer groups opposed to the rapid increases in prices
and environmental groups opposed to the expansion in capacity. As
state executives began to appoint commissioners who represented
consumer and environmental viewpoints, more and more commissions began to examine rate structure issues carefully.
In a number of cases the commissions also ordered time-of-day
rates be made available to some classes of customers, usually large
industrial and commercial users. Lifeline rates also were introduced
in a number of states. The Madison Gas and Electric case begun in
1972 and decided in 1974 by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission was a landmark.2 3 The majority of the commissioners embraced
the economic principles of marginal cost pricing and indicated a
longer run interest in seasonal and time-of-day rates. By 1977, 12
state commissions had held generic hearings on retail electric rate
structure reform and 19 states had time-of-day rates available or
proposed for at least some customers. New York and Wisconsin had
made substantial progress in implementing rate reform by this time.
In December 1974 the National Association of Regulatory Utility
22. The situation has been far different in Europe, however. See NERA, ANALYSIS OF
ELECTRICITY PRICING IN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN, ELECTRIC UTILITY
RATE DESIGN STUDY TOPIC 1.2 (1977); B. MITCHELL & W. MANNING, PEAK-LOAD
PRICING: EUROPEAN LESSONS FOR U.S. ENERGY POLICY (1978).
23. Supra note 18.
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Commissioners (NARUC) asked the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to conduct several types of studies into rate design issues
as an aid to the state commissions. Since then EPRI's Rate Design
Study has produced about 60 reports dealing with many aspects of
the rate design problem, including analyses of alternative costing and
pricing methodologies, demand elasticity considerations, rate experiments, and metering and other technologies for exploiting seasonal
and time-of-day prices. NARUC's request reflected the growing interest of state commissions in these issues and the need for information
about alternatives proposed in hearings.
The move to new rate structures based on marginal cost principles
faced considerable opposition. As a general matter large commercial
and industrial consumers were opposed to the rate reform initiatives
because they felt that they would end up paying more for electricity.
This perception was not motivated entirely by the fact that some of
these customers used power more intensively at peak times than their
rates reflected, and/or would have difficulty reducing peak consumption in response to higher prices (although this was one source of the
objections from large users). Perhaps more important was the fear
that one way or another they would end up paying for a larger
proportion of the total costs of supplying electricity.
This perception was based on a number of reasonable assumptions.
If all customers were charged marginal cost, total revenues generated
would be larger than the total revenues allowed, using traditional
average historical cost calculations for determining "total revenue
requirements." Due to (1) inflated construction costs; (2) the use of
the average historical cost of debt for making allowed rate of return
determinations; and (3) prevailing regulatory depreciation and valuation procedures, marginal costs appeared to be above average historical cost as it is calculated for determining the total revenues allowed
to the utility. Under pressure from consumer groups lobbying for
lifeline rates and other forms of rate relief, the larger customers
feared they would pay marginal cost, while smaller residential customers paid less than average historical cost. As a result larger users
thought they would bear a larger proportion of the revenue requirements than they had under the prevailing system. Industrial customers argued higher rates would make them less competitive with
firms in other states, and predicted dire economic consequences resulting from reform.
Many utilities also opposed the rate reform initiatives. Faced with
deteriorating financial situations" they were concerned about the
24. Joskow & MacAvoy, Regulation and the Financial Condition of the Electric Power
Companies in the 1970's, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 295-301 (May 1975).
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uncertainties associated with these new rates. They did not know
how consumption would respond to seasonal time-of-day rates and
worried about the additional metering costs. They viewed time-ofday rates as yielding more unstable streams of revenues, since so
much revenue would be produced by a relatively small number of
hours during the year. In addition, they were concerned the commissions were promising consumers much more than could actually be
delivered, especially since most commissions glossed over the fact
that while some customer bills might fall with time-of-day rates and
lifeline rates, other easily could increase with the new rates. They
feared the wrath of a lot of unhappy customers. Finally, I suspect that
many of those within utility companies who traditionally had been
responsible for ratemaking preferred to keep doing things the way
they always had.
The large consumers and the utilities raised a large number of
objections to time-of-day pricing in general and marginal cost pricing
in particular. While many commissions moved steadily but cautiously
toward the introduction of these types of rate reforms, many other
states virtually did nothing.
Until passage of PURPA, these issues were argued and resolved on
a state-by-state basis. After all, it was the states that had exclusive
regulatory authority over retail rates. The Federal Power Act limited
the rate activities of the Federal Power Commission (now FERC) to
interstate wholesale rate activities, 2 s and the FPC essentially ignored
the growing controversy within the states over rate structure reform.
After the oil embargo and the rapid rise in energy prices in 1974,
federal authorities responsible for energy policy in the executive
branch (the Federal Energy Office, Federal Energy Administration,
and now the Department of Energy) took an increasing interest in
state rate reform activities. These state initiatives were seen as ways
of encouraging energy conservation, reducing the demand for electricity, improving load factors and making base load coal and nuclear
plants more attractive. 2 6 However by and large the executive branch
efforts were limited to encouragement and to funding about ten
residential time-of-day experiments. These were designed to resolve
some of the controversies about the costs and effects of time-of-day
rates on residential consumers. 2 7
25. 16 U.S.C. §824 (1976).
26. See WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION RE MADISON GAS AND
ELECTRIC COMPANY (order dated August 8, 1978). See generally EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN
(April 29, 1977).
27. Among the states which have conducted or are conducting residential time-of-day
rate experiments are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island and Vermont.
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By 1977, the Carter administration and some members of Congress were convinced rate reform was an essential part of U.S. energy
policy and that many states were not moving fast enough to implement such reforms. While federal action was seen as necessary to
move the process along, the imposition of federal regulatory initiatives raised serious questions about federal power for an area in
which the states traditionally had had complete responsibility. There
were also practical questions whether any type of federal regulatory
agency could determine effectively the desired electricity rates for
hundreds of companies facing diverse cost, production opportunity,
and consumption patterns. Title I of PURPA is the result of the
intense. political controversy that ensued between mid-1977 and late
1978. It is a compromise. Title I directs the states to examine a
variety of ratemaking issues and establishes particular standards that
should be investigated. However, the consideration and adoption of
these standards remains largely up to the states, although there is the
threat that states which do not comply may find themselves faced
with further federal initiatives in a few years.
The debate over PURPA already has had at least one unfortunate
administrative consequence. In the nearly two years between the first
administration proposals and the time the President finally signed the
bill, state rate reforms slowed considerably as the state commissions
waited to see what the federal legislation locked like. Furthermore,
the legislation that was passed appears to contain very strict requirements for grandfathering of states that already had considered and
even implemented many of the federal standards that were established by PURPA. As a result, many states which already have made
substantial progress may have to go through the time-consuming and
costly public hearing process once again. While we will never know
for sure, it is conceivable that this act has delayed rate reform in
many states because of the reluctance of a few to move in the desired
direction. This is especially true if reluctant states ultimately find it
easy to fulfill the statutory requirements of "consideration" and
"determination" without actually making any actual changes. Whether this will be the case depends on how far the federal government
is willing and able to press the states in these areas, and what the
states would have been willing to do on their own without the additional federal encouragement.
THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PURPA TITLE I
The provisions, conference report, and the legislative history leading to the passage of PURPA indicate that economic efficiency criteria are to be more important in formulating retail electric power
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rates. Except perhaps for the provisions for lifeline rates of Section
114,28 there are two major principles which form the basis of the
standards established in Title I. First, rates should be designed to
reflect the cost of providing electric power to different types of
customers. Second, where there are transactions costs associated with
implementation such as metering costs, the benefits of any change in
rate policy should be balanced against the costs of implementation.
Given these basic principles, the definition of cost that is to be
used in considering and making determinations about the various
standards is of primary interest. Except for issues associated with
lifeline rates, the history of state rate reform initiatives and the debates that led to the passage of PURPA indicate that there was relatively little disagreement over the principle that "cost" should play a
primary role in establishing retail electric power rates. However,
there was considerable disagreement over how "cost" should be
measured. On the one hand, economists and environmental groups
argued efforts should be made to base electric rates on marginal cost
principles. Indeed, it appears there was considerable pressure to provide explicitly for the use of marginal or incremental costs in the
statute itself.2 9
On the other hand utilities, large industrial consumers, and state
regulatory commissions favored language which would keep the definition of "cost" rather vague, with specific definitions to be provided
by the individual state regulatory agencies. Proponents of this view
apparently were motivated by two considerations. First, many utilities and industrial consumers (as discussed above) had opposed the
use of marginal cost principles by state regulatory agencies and did
not want the federal government to order state commissions to use
marginal costs as their basic standard for ratemaking. If costs-were to
be used as the standard, they preferred to be able to use one of the
myriad "fully allocated" historical cost methodologies traditionally
used to allocate revenue requirements among the different classes of
customers.3
It was thought that these historical cost allocation
techniques readily could be adapted to the more detailed cost justi28. 16 U.S.C.A. §2624 (Supp. 1979).
29. Some early drafts of the bill contained explicit references to marginal or incremental,
costs and a considerable amount of testimony was presented for and against this cost
principle.
30. The term "fully allocated costs" refers to the process of distributing test year costs,
including historical capital costs, among the various customer classes. A large number of
specific allocational techniques have been used for performing such allocations. This process
insures that there is no over or under recovery of historical costs since all allowed costs are
allocated to one customer class or another. These allocational procedures do not necessarily
reflect any causal relationship between current consumption and current costs of services.
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fications of alternative rate structures, which the act required. Of
course, since there are at least 20 different fully allocated cost techniques that have been used and no theoretical economic principles on
which to base a choice among them, it would be easy to provide a
cost justification for almost any rate structure.
The second source of opposition to the use of marginal cost in the
statute apparently resulted from the general opposition of utilities,
industrial consumers and state regulatory commissions to the expansion of federal regulatory authority into an area traditionally reserved for the states. The general view was that the choice of costing
methodologies was an issue for the state regulatory commissions to
decide, not the federal government. So opposition, especially by
state regulatory commissions, did not necessarily imply a rejection of
marginal cost principles. Indeed, many states already had determined
marginal costs should be utilized in setting rates.
Section 115(a) represents a compromise between the positions
taken by these various groups. The conference report makes it clear a
state regulatory authority "has the discretion to select which costing
methodology or methodologies it chooses, consistent with state
law."' ' On the other hand, the specific factors that the statute
suggests should be taken into account have a decidedly marginalist
flavor to them. Section 115(a) recognizes that costs are likely to vary
by time of day and season of the year, a concept which is based on
the theoretical and empirical work on marginal cost pricing of electric power, not on the "fully allocated" cost approaches that utilities
and commissions had traditionally used in this country. PURPA
requires costing methodologies to try to "take into account the extent to which total costs to an electric utility are likely to change if
(A) additional capacity is added to meet peak demand relative to
base demand; and (B) additional kilowatt-hours of electric energy are
delivered to electric consumers." 3 'his is almost the definition of
marginal dost. No other specific costing methodology is mentioned in
either the statute or in the conference report. It is fair to say therefore that the statute has a strong preference for marginal cost principle. However, it is also clear from the conference report that the
state regulatory authorities can abide by their own preferences regarding costing methodologies. 3 I
Whatever the individual state commissions decide to do, marginal
cost pricing principles provide the only consistent links between Title
31. Supra note 10, at 78.
32. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2625 (Supp. 1979).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7813-7814.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

I's objective of promoting efficiency in the consumption and production of electricity and the six federal ratemaking standards established in Section 111. Marginal cost pricing theory leads directly to
empirical guidelines for establishing rates based on the cost of service, time-of-day rates, seasonal rates and interruptible rates, all of
which promote economic efficiency. There is no natural link between arbitrary historical cost allocation formulas and the six federal
ratemaking standards. At best some historical allocation procedures
may approximate the relative cost patterns indicated by the appropriate calculation of marginal costs. At worst, such allocation procedures may be used arbitrarily to justify virtually any rate structure
that one chooses. It is unfortunate that the act does not recognize
more explicitly the importance of using marginal cost as a basis for
rate reform.
The importance of transactions costs also is made quite clear in the
statute. PURPA recognizes that the implementation of various rate
reforms cannot be achieved without cost. Cost effectiveness is identified as an important factor in the consideration of time-of-day rates,
load management techniques and the standards for master metering.
The act clearly implies that in making determinations in these areas
the benefits from the reform must be weighed against the transactions costs. In the case of time-of-day rates, additional metering
costs are the critical element on the cost side of this equation. The
cost issue arises primarily in the case of residential and small commercial consumers whose single dial kilowatt-hour meters would have
to be replaced with more sophisticated and expensive time-of-day
meters. Additional metering costs are the critical element on the cost
side of the master metering standard as well. The cost elements to be
considered for load management are not specified, nor are load management techniques contemplated by the statute.
PURPA contains little guidance regarding the appropriate methods
for evaluating the benefits associated with the implementation of
these rate standards. Where guidance is given it is not clear that the
indicated approach will promote economic efficiency. Consider the
problem of evaluating the benefits of time-of-day rates. Prices for
consumption during peak periods will rise and prices for consumption during off-peak periods will fall once such rates are implemented. It will cost more to consume during peak periods and in the
long run, other things being equal, consumption should fall as consumers respond to higher prices. Similarly, consumption during offpeak periods should rise in response to the lower prices as a result of
a shift from peak to off-peak consumption, as well as "new" consumption during the off-peak period that is encouraged by the lower
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prices. In the long run, innovation in appliance and capital stock
should make it easier for consumers to exploit the off-peak rates,
especially if economic energy storage media can be developed. As a
result of these consumption shifts, utilities will have to build less
peak capacity and use more efficient base load capacity more intensively, which would reduce the average cost of electricity. However,
the net welfare gains to be achieved depend on a variety of demand
and supply elasticities for which we have only imperfect knowledge.
While the various residential rate experiments may give us some further information, the record to date indicates that we will get little
more than qualitative agreement on the nature of consumer responses. In short, in the near future it is unlikely that state commissions are going to be in a position to make any more than educated
guesses about the benefits from time-of-day rates, which are to be
compared with the additional metering costs.
In the past the lack of detailed information about the relevant
supply and demand elasticities has often been raised as a reason for
delaying any reforms at all. But just because information is incomplete does not mean that we know nothing or that reasonable decisions cannot be made. From basic economic theory and existing
empirical work we know the qualitative effects of time-of-day
pricing, and in many cases can make reasonable lower bound estimates of the relevant demand elasticities. For large industrial and
commercial customers who have very large bills and already have
recording demand meters there is no issue. There are no additional
metering costs and the direct efficiency gains from the time-of-day
rates set equal to marginal cost must be positive. Time-of-day rates
based on marginal cost will be cost effective for these customers as
long as there is any demand elasticity whatsoever. Similarly, for large
industrial and commercial consumers who do not now have the
appropriate meters, but for whom the costs of the additional meters
are trivial compared to the resources used to provide them with
electric power, even with very small price elasticities the efficiency
gains from time-of-day prices (if they are based on marginal cost)
probably will be larger than the additional metering costs.
For smaller customers where the benefit/cost ratio is more uncertain a variety of approaches seem to make sense. Marginal cost-based
time-of-day rates could be introduced gradually to customers with
the largest annual consumption levels or with appliances that tend to
be used during peak periods. The initial cutoff point could be based
on reasonable lower bound estimates of the relevant demand elasticities. The consumption patterns of these customers could be followed
over time and the time-of-day rates gradually extended to customers
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with less consumption as more information is obtained. An alternative and perhaps more attractive approach would be to set up the
time-of-day rates on an optional basis, allowing individual consumers
to make their own cost/benefit calculations by requiring that they
pay for the appropriate metering devices if they choose to take the
optional rates.
A number of things should be noted at this point. The efficiency
consequences of any of these rate reforms can be evaluated only if
the resulting prices either are set equal to marginal cost or if we
know the relationship between the prices and marginal cost, since
marginal cost is the relevant cost concept for efficiency calculations.
If state commissions adopt alternative costing methodologies their
efficiency consequences will be almost impossible to determine. And,
even for those classes of customers which are not presented with
time-of-day rates, an effort must be made to develop a rate structure
which best approximates marginal cost, given the load characteristics
of these customers and the available metering technology. For example, under optional time-of-day rates we would not want to provide residential customers with optional marginal cost-based time-ofday rates, if we did not also make an effort to calculate the traditional hour invariant residential tariff based on marginal cost
considerations as well. Those customers who consume electricity less
intensively at peak times and are most willing to adjust their consumption patterns will be the first to opt for the optional time-ofday rates. The load characteristics of the remaining customers in the
class would then on the average be worse, and the time invariant rate
should go up to reflect this deterioration and to encourage more
customers to adopt the time-of-day rates.
The benefits to be achieved from any of the rate standards can not
be evaluated by looking only at the reduction in peak demand and
the value of capital and energy resources "saved" by such a reduction. The appropriate benefit calculation is more complicated. As
prices are raised during the peak period and consumption declines,
resources are saved during the peak period, but consumers also suffer
a loss in welfare as a result of the increased prices. The net benefit
from raising peak period prices to marginal cost will be approximately half of the resource savings. To this must be added the gain in
consumers' surplus resulting from the reduction in prices off-peak
less the additional costs of providing additional off-peak power.
PURPA gives more specific guidance for performing cost effectiveness analysis in the cases of master metering and load management
techniques. Consumers occupying buildings with master meters face
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a consumption charge of zero.' ' As a result, it is presumed that they
consume too much electricity. The costs of electricity consumption
are somehow passed on to the users in their rents. But if consumers
and owners of buildings behave rationally, we would expect to find
master meters utilized only if the associated rates yield lower electricity costs than the individual meter alternative. This means either
that the individual meters have a cost which is greater than what
would be saved by going to individual meters (in which case the
master metering provision would be inoperable), or that there is
something wrong with the rates under which master metering customers are billed-in particular, that they do not reflect the marginal
costs of serving these types of customers. If master metering represents an efficiency problem the way to resolve it is to make sure that
the individual meter and master meter rates reflect the correct costs
of service, and that building owners are given a choice between the
two types of rates. This approach would take the problem of performing a cost benefit analysis off the backs of the state commissions
by giving consumers the proper price signals.
The load management technique standard raises other problems.
The history of government and utility thinking on load management
indicates that many conceive of load management techniques as ways
of forcing consumers to change their consumption patterns by fiat,
rather than by giving them appropriate price incentives to do so
voluntarily. For example, it has sometimes been suggested that
weather-related peak capacity requirements could be reduced if some
customers' loads could be curtailed during peak consumption periods.3 I In theory interruptible rates would provide the appropriate
response more efficiently by allowing these customers who value
peak consumption least (time-of-day rates can only imperfectly deal
with weather-sensitive loads) to choose to be curtailed by offering a
rate reduction which reflects the value to the system of reducing the
load, which, in turn, will be a function of the marginal cost of peak
consumption. Some combination of time-of-day rates and interruptible rates will almost always be superior to any form of forced load
curtailment unless the metering costs for these rates are higher than
the welfare losses associated with forced curtailment techniques.
However, PURPA's cost effectiveness standard provides no way to
include consumers' valuation of receiving power at different times
into the cost/benefit computation, or for comparing load management techniques with "voluntary" pricing techniques. On the con34. 16 U.S.C.A. §2625 (Supp. 1979).
35. Id.
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trary, the cost effectiveness criterion is weighted heavily in favor of
forced curtailment of power supplies without any consideration of
the value of the power to the consumer. For Section 115 indicates
that a load management technique would be cost effective if it reduces peak demand and if the cost saving to the utility is greater than
the costs of the load management techniques. 3 6 Thus a utility which
randomly curtailed customers on hot summer days instead of building enough capacity to serve them would save substantial production
costs and incur little in the way of additional costs of "implementing" this load management technique. But this could prove to be an
extremely costly policy from the viewpoint of consumers. This is
simply an inappropriate test for cost effectiveness and is a blatant
invitation to the inefficient and probably inequitable non-price
rationing of power.
To sum up, the act's emphasis on cost effectiveness is consistent
with considerations of economic efficiency. However, the act gives
little useful guidance to state regulatory commissions for implementing such considerations and where guidance is provided it could
easily lead to perverse results. Furthermore, the importance of marginal cost considerations pertains not only to the formulation of
rates themselves, but also to the performance of the cost effectiveness standards established by PURPA.
The importance of efficiency considerations also is exemplified by
the act's provisions for the review of fuel adjustment mechanisms. It
is generally acknowledged that as a theoretical matter automatic
adjustment mechanisms may provide disincentives to cost-minimizing
behavior.3 I At least two types of distortions could result. First,
automatic pass-through provisions for fuel costs might lead firms to
favor excessively fuel-intensive generating equipment, especially in a
world of inflation, fluctuating interest rates and regulatory lag (a
reverse Averch-Johnson effect 3 8). Second, firms may become less
aggressive in seeking the least expensive fuel contracts if increases or
decreases in fuel costs are fully and rapidly reflected in the rates.
Given rapid inflation in fuel costs and regulatory lag, it does not
seem feasible or desirable to eliminate automatic adjustment clauses
entirely. It does, however, make good sense to encourage the state
commissions to review these clauses every few years, as well as to
36. 16 U.S.C.A. §2625(c) (Supp. 1979).
37. See, e.g., D. Baron & R. DeBondt, Fuel Adjustment Mechanisms and Economic
Efficiency (1978) (unpublished).
38. The theoretical literature on rate-of-return legislation indicates that rate-of-return
regulation provides incentives for utilities to use more capital-intensive techniques than
would be efficient. See Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
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establish methods for monitoring utility behavior to insure that efficient fuel choice and fuel purchase policies are adopted. Developing
the latter is not likely to be an easy task, however, and PURPA
provides no guidance as to how the state commissions might go
about doing so.
The PURPA provisions for lifeline rates and termination procedures also make it clear that economic efficiency is not the only
criterion that the act anticipates state commissions will use in formulating rates. The strengths and weaknesses of redistributing income
through the introduction of lifeline rates has been discussed in detail
elsewhere.' I PURPA requires that states consider lifeline rates as a
way of providing "necessary" electricity service at "reasonable" rates
and suggests that states can implement lifeline rates whether or not
they pass the cost and efficiency criteria which characterize most of
Title I. With regard to termination procedures the states are virtually
required to adopt specific due process procedures, and to provide
that service cannot be terminated if such termination would be especially dangerous to health and the customer is unable to pay for the
service. 4 As a general matter, I do not believe that the electric
power system is a particularly effective vehicle for redistributing
income. There are reasonable humanitarian principles behind the
termination procedures which make them difficult to object to, despite the efficiency losses that are associated with them. We should
recognize, however, that it may be difficult to restrict the application
of these procedures to cases in which there would be general agreement that they should apply.
PERSPECTIVE ON IMPLEMENTATION

As I indicated above the primary, direct impact of this legislation
is to require states to consider various ratemaking standards and to
make determinations regarding their applicability on a utility-byutility basis. The act will prove to be valuable if it leads many of
those states that had been reluctant to implement these types of rate
reforms previously to do so now, based on appropriate cost and costeffectiveness criteria. It will be a rather costly piece of legislation if
the reluctant states go through the required hearing processes without changing their posture toward rate reform. This is true not only
because of the resources wasted in conducting perfunctory "compliance" hearings. Those states which have been rather progressive in
39. See generally Pace, The Poor, the Elderly, and the Rising Cost of Energy, 95 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 26 (June 5, 1975); Berg & Roth, Some remarks on residential electricity
consumption and social rate restructuring, 7 BELL J. ECON. 690 (1976).
40. 16 U.S.C.A. §2625(g) (Supp. 1979).
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many of these areas are now likely to have to slow the process down
by conducting the utility-by-utility public hearings for each of the
rate standards that the act requires. It is indeed unfortunate that the
act does not provide for more liberal grandfathering of states which
have made serious and extensive efforts in many of these areas in the
past few years.
In January 1979 EPRI conducted a survey of the previous rate

design activities of all state regulatory commissions to compare them
with the federal ratemaking standards provided for under Sections
111, 113, and 114 of PURPA.4 1 Tables 1, 2, and 3 report the results

of this survey based on responses from 43 of the 50 state regulatory
TABLE 1
State Regulatory Activities Related to Federal Raternaking
Standards Under Section 111 and Section 113
(number of states out of 43 responses)

Cost of service
Declining block rates
Time-of-day rates
Seasonal rates
Interruptible rates
Load control
Lifeline rates

Considered

Determined

Inplemented

34
35
29
32
30
25
30

27
28
18
29
26
16
22

27
28
15
29
26
14
7

Source: Reference Manual and Procedures for Implementing PURPA (Draft February
1979), Electric Utility Rate Design Study.

TABLE 2
State Regulatory Activities Regarding Standards Under Section 113
(number of states adopted)
Master metering
Automatic adjustment clauses
Customer information
Termination
Advertising

A dop ted
23
23
18
24
33

Source: Reference Manual and Procedures for Implementing PURPA (Draft February
1979), Electric Utility Rate Design Study.
41. ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, REFERENCE MANUAL AND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING PURPA, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DESIGN STUDY,
Part 5 (1979) (draft).
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TABLE 3
State Regulatory Activities Regarding Time-of-Day Rates
(number of states adopted)
Time-of-day or seasonal rates*

27

Costs by time period*

16

Marginal cost data used

10

*Permanent rates, not experimental rates
Source: Reference Manual and Procedures for Implementing PURPA (Draft February
1979), Electric Utility Rate Design Study.

commissions. With regard to some of the standards about two-thirds
of the responding states indicate that they have considered and made
determinations of the standards consistent with the PURPA guidelines. However, in two areas a much smaller proportion of the states
indicate both consideration and determination. Very few states indicate both in all areas. It remains unclear whether the state commissions have really complied with the specific hearing requirements and
the utility-by-utility considerations and determinations required by
the act. While the Secretary of Energy ultimately will determine how
strictly to interpret these requirements, my sense is that a considerable amount of additional public hearings are likely to be required in
most states.
Of some concern is the fact that only 10 states have used marginal
cost data in formulating time-of-day rates. As I indicated above,
marginal cost data are essential for evaluating the efficiency and cost
effectiveness of all of the standards established in Title I. The definition of cost made in Section 115 is certainly consistent with marginal
cost, but the states are not required to use such a definition in their
deliberations. Since DOE will appear as the intervenor in many of the
public hearings that will occur as a result of the act, it is hoped the

department will press the case for the use of marginal cost and appropriate calculations of the economic implications of the various rate
standards. Another way the federal government could demonstrate
the appropriate use of marginal cost data, the formulation of rates
that economically conserve energy, and the correct methodologies
for doing cost effectiveness calculations would be to implement these
procedures as part of the federal interstate ratemaking process. It
would be helpful if FERC could represent progressive leadership in
this area, rather than following in the tradition of its previous incarnation, the Federal Power Commission.
Those states which do decide to adopt marginal cost pricing principles probably will find themselves faced with the problem of
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rationalizing their rate structure methodology with the traditional
methods of determining the total revenues that the regulated firm is
allowed to earn. Under prevailing ratemaking practice total revenues
allowed are determined by applying the allowed rate of return to an
original cost rate base.4 2 The rate base is determined in most states
as the sum of the original cost of all plant and equipment less accumulated depreciation. 4 ' For a variety of reasons this approach tends
to underestimate seriously the true marginal cost of plant and equipment to the firm in many cases. As a result, rates based on marginal
costs may yield total revenues greater than those permitted under
traditional rate of return on rate base regulation.
Most states which have tried to implement marginal cost pricing
principles have to confront this problem. There are two general
approaches that could be taken to resolve it. The determination of
the rate base and the general methodology for determining total
revenues could be brought into consonance with the marginal cost
pricing principles being used to determine the rate structure. For
example, replacement cost and economic depreciation could be used
in place of traditional accounting methods for determining the rate
base. Such an approach would probably lead to substantial capital
gains to utility investors if the marginal cost of capital were to be
applied to such a rate base. As a result, I suspect that this approach is
simply not acceptable politically. Presumably some kind of excess
profits tax could be devised, but it would probably be distortional
and has many potential problems associated with it.
The alternative that most state commissions appear to find attractive is to "back off" of marginal costs to minimize consumption
distortions and reduce total revenues to the allowed level. This requires that the regulatory commission identify components of demand which are not very sensitive to price and to reduce the associated prices below marginal costs to meet the revenue constraint.
One way to do this would be to reduce the customer cost component
of the rate or charges for the first few units of consumption. Neither
the decision to hook up to the electric power system nor consumption decisions on the margin is likely to be affected in this way.
Coincidentally, the resulting rate would tend to look like a modest
lifeline rate.
Over the next two or three years we will see whether the state
regulatory agencies can respond appropriately and effectively to the
challenge that Title I of PURPA represents. If special interest groups
42. See 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 20-58 (1970).
43. Id.
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continue to convince the state commissions to serve their interests
rather than the national objective, presumably there are enough electrons that cross state lines to make it possible for the federal government to take over the retail ratemaking process entirely. There are
many reasons to believe that such an expansion of federal authority
would be undesirable, so it is hoped that the states will 'take Title I
seriously and continue to make the long overdue reforms in retail
electric rates.

